




Director of  
Central  
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National Intelligence Council



## NIC Threat Outlook

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## NIC THREAT OUTLOOK

Recent intelligence reflected in this Outlook points up:

- Sharply deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations.
- Possible Soviet airbase, or base rights, in Libya?
- Lebanon—moment of truth.
- A prospect of sharply rising terrorist activities.
- Soviet development of mass-destruction conventional weapon alternatives to tactical nuclear weapons.

1. ***Sharply Deteriorating Greek-Turkish Relations.*** The exchange of fire between Greek and Turkish military border patrols in Thrace on 5 February is the latest graphic illustration of a serious deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations that is taking place over a broad range of issues. Tensions are high on both sides. An escalation in hostilities could occur at any time, possibly with little warning.

— There are many strands to these acute Greek-Turkish frictions, and the roots of the current escalation go back a decade. These problems have grown worse since the advent of Papandreou and his provocative conduct. Now these various strands have come together at one time:

- With the failure of the Cyprus summit, the UN-sponsored talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have broken down. Denktash is moving to consolidate his independent Turkish state on Cyprus while the Greek Cypriot National Guard is set to resume major arms purchases.
- [ ] indicate that the Greeks are negotiating with the Syrians over basing Greek fighter aircraft in Syria—which is much closer to Cyprus than the Greek mainland—in the event of a Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus.
- The Turks have been especially alarmed by Papandreou's proclamation of a new Greek Defense Doctrine explicitly identifying Turkey as the principal enemy, and by certain command changes within the Greek military. The Turkish National Security Council has met to adopt appropriate "political and military" measures. Now both sides are raising the readiness of their military units around the Aegean and are reacting more aggressively to each other. [ ]

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[redacted] to last December, Greek and Turkish pilots have not been breaking off contact immediately upon engagement, but engaging in mock air combat maneuvers. Commanders on both sides reportedly fear that a "hot-headed" pilot or ship commander could precipitate a military engagement.

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- Not least, Papandreou is visiting Moscow this week and, if past performance is any guide, will probably make some more provocative statements that will rekindle arguments over the extent of Greece's allegiance to NATO.

— To make matters worse, none of the major actors seems prone to make concessions or respond to US pressures. [redacted]

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[redacted] the purpose of Greek Cypriot Chief Kyprianou's request for a meeting with President Reagan is to propose to the United States that Cyprus join NATO in exchange for US pressures on Turkey and Denktash! The nature of this alleged plan is indicative of Kyprianou's present state of mind.

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— The outlook is somber. At a minimum there will be renewed and probably more intensive disputes within NATO. And at worst, there could be more shooting incidents—with a possibility that one side or the other will take action that will cause a serious military clash.

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## 2. *Possible Soviet Airbase, or Base Rights, in Libya?*

— [redacted]

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only Russian could be spoken [redacted] once again raises the question as to whether the large modern *Al Jufra* base has been built by the Soviets in hopes that they will eventually use it. Should this occur, the consequences for US security interests in the Mediterranean could be substantial.

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— In the past, the Soviet military made almost no use of Libyan facilities until 1981, when the Libyans permitted them to use Tobruk to repair submarines from their own subtender. At that time, Soviet IL-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft also began to deploy to *Umm Atiqah Airfield* near Tripoli. These planes

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use this field periodically as a deployment site for Mediterranean patrols, but it serves mainly as a Libyan fighter, bomber, and transport base.

- Some two years ago, the Soviets began construction on a *new airfield at Al Jufra* in north central Libya, some 200 km south of the Gulf of Sidra. Construction has been carried out according to Soviet design specifications, the Soviets have reportedly rigidly controlled base access, and support facilities there have been built for certain weapons the Libyans do not yet have. These factors suggest that *Al Jufra* has been intended for eventual Soviet use—on their own, or perhaps jointly with the Libyans.
- Al Jufra is a large modern military airfield with a 4,200-by-60 meter concrete runway, 24 hardened aircraft shelters, underground POL storage, and a communications facility. There are 12 revetted hardstands, AAM and ASM storage, and GCI and GCA control systems—features similar to those found at military airfields in the USSR. Libyan AN-26 transports and MIG-25 fighters have used the airfield periodically since late 1983, [redacted] that Al Jufra will be the principal base for Libyan TU-22 bombers and MIG-25 fighters. Soviet aircraft use of Al Jufra has not as yet been noted.
- Construction of this modern base—well inside Libya but within easy range of the Mediterranean—has raised concern, particularly at CINCUSNAVEUR, about possible future Soviet use by strike aircraft. A year or two ago, such usage would have seemed uncharacteristic of the Soviets. But years ago they were interested in possibly using Mersa Matru airbase in northwestern Egypt, and their more recent stationing of strike and fighter aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, indicates that they will deploy such forces when advantageous to them and when permitted by the host country.
- US Intelligence Community representatives agreed in NIE 11-6-84, *Soviet Global Military Reach*, that Libyan control of Al Jufra was expected, and that this field was not as convenient as Umm Atiqah for Soviet maritime patrols. But [redacted] [redacted] reference to Russian personnel in an operational context at Al Jufra clearly opens the question once again. It is possible [redacted] only that the Soviets have not yet turned over the airfield to the Libyans, but this appears unusual since the Libyans have been using the field for more than a year. Qadhafi's characteristic reluctance to allow foreign facilities on Libyan territory may be the current impediment to use of Al Jufra by Soviet aircraft.

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3. ***Lebanon—Moment of Truth.*** The first phase of the Israeli withdrawal on 18 February will be a key test of power among many of the groups engaged in the bloody struggles now raging in Lebanon and will give us some indication of how power relationships will turn out there in the future. There is danger that the upshot will be a southern Lebanon marked by feuding radical forces operating in uncontrolled fashion against Western, Israeli, and Jordanian targets in the region.

- ***The Palestinians and the Druze.*** With the Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian camps and settlements around Sidon will be up for grabs. Syria is determined that pro-Syrian radical Palestinians should dominate these Palestinian communities, while Arafat's PLO forces will struggle to retain a voice. The Druze will contest Christian control of the Kharrub area in the south, possibly leading to massacres. Jumblatt, who has been skilled at playing off the Syrians against the Israelis, may find his options dwindling.
- ***Syria and Iran.*** As Israel withdraws, control of the Shias in southern Lebanon will also be at issue. Nabih Barri's Amal organization is still struggling against radical Shia groups supported by Iran for control of the south, and is itself making more radical noises. If radical Shia elements do win out, this could lead even to attacks by Shia fanatics *within Israel's borders*. Syria will not be able to control this struggle for power within the Shias. Israel will not be able to expel the Shias—as they did the PLO earlier—because the Shias are more numerous and are native residents of the area.
- ***Syria and Israel.*** With the Israeli withdrawal, Syria will have to make further decisions about its future relationship with Israel. Will it try to restrain attacks against Israel proper—feasible with the PLO but not with the Shias? Will Syria continue to cooperate closely with Iran in the broader sense if Iran pushes Syria toward conflict with Israel? A traditional Syrian-Israeli standoff will prove far less attainable as long as the Iranians remain in Lebanon, yet Syria will not wish to lose these potent radical allies.
- ***Syria and Lebanon.*** Damascus will also have to decide what it wishes the future Lebanon to look like. It may support both Nabih Barri and the Iranians in order to keep the Shias divided. It will have to decide what protection if any to offer the

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Maronites should the Shias ever decide to move against them; also, how to deal with increased fundamentalist influence in the Sunni community, as well as with direct Shia threats to the Sunni.

#### 4. *A Prospect of Sharply Rising Terrorist Activities.*

— For the first time we are seeing definite, close cooperation among certain West European terrorist groups. [redacted]

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[redacted] points to a greater frequency and coordination of terrorist attacks among a variety of terrorist groups which have been attacking NATO and American targets in West Germany, France, Belgium, and Portugal. The attackers have included the Red Army Faction in West Germany, Direct Action in France, the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells, and FP-25 in Portugal. Their targets will include not only US and West European diplomatic and military installations, but also private companies that manufacture defense-related items and organizations that foster broad West European or transatlantic cooperation.

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— In the Middle East, meanwhile, there is evidence that certain terrorist groups may soon be using more inventiveness in their modus operandi. For example:

- The Iranian Government has made inquiries in Western countries concerning immediate procurement of remote radio-controlled equipment for use in motor vehicles and boats.

- [redacted] the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has tasked the Islamic Jihad Organization to carry out a propaganda campaign asserting that the United States intends to attack Muslims in Lebanon in retaliation for terrorist attacks on US interests. The Iranian MFA stressed [redacted]

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[redacted] that the campaign was to be carried out in the name of Islamic Jihad, not Hizballah—the first definite link, incidentally, between the Iranians and Islamic Jihad. The campaign will threaten that all American hostages now held in Lebanon will be killed and that US interests everywhere will be attacked if the United States acts in retaliation against Muslims in Lebanon.

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— In any event, an escalation is to be expected meanwhile in radical Palestinian attacks against the mainline PLO and moderate Arab states. A prolonged terrorist feud between Syria and Arafat's PLO is developing, and some attacks against one or the other side may take place in Europe.

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**5. Soviet Development of Mass-Destruction Conventional Weapon Alternatives to Tactical Nuclear Weapons.**

- Moscow has exploited and built upon US technology captured in Vietnam to develop and field “conventional” munitions that approximate the effects of small nuclear explosions. The Soviets have been sufficiently impressed by the performance of these weapons to add them to their list of battlefield “weapons of mass destruction,” previously limited to nuclear, chemical, and biological arms.
- These additions to the Soviet arsenal are of two major types: enhanced blast weapons and fuel-air explosives. Enhanced blast weapons, which the Soviets call “munitions of increased power,” are similar to the 7-ton US BLU-82 bomb. Both employ inexpensive mixtures of aluminized explosives or aluminum powder activated by a small core of conventional explosive to release high levels of energy and overpressure. For their part, fuel-air explosives achieve similar results by creating a cloud of volatile liquid or dust particles that is ignited by a conventional explosive to form a large diameter explosion.
- We expect that the Soviets would use such weapons in conventional conflicts to destroy prepared defensive positions previously targeted by theater nuclear systems as a part of their strategy to control escalation. These munitions are equally well suited for employment in unconventional conflicts against enemy forces concealed in caves or by jungle foliage.

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